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?I. Introduction
This paper looks at some of the longer−term fiscal issues in Japan arising from likely developments
in the health and nursing care sector. It first looks at recent OECD information on spending patterns.
Likely future trends in spending are then discussed drawing on the results of recent expenditure
projections of health and nursing care out to 2050. This is followed by a discussion of possible policy
responses, focusing on areas where the efficiency of health care provision might be improved. Some
tentative conclusions are drawn in a final section.
II. How Does the Japanese Health and Nursing Care System Perform?
The current health care system in Japan performs well when compared with most other OECD
countries (Jeong and Hurst, 2001; Imai, 2002). The social insurance system provides for full coverage
of the population for the cost of health care. A wide range of health risks is covered and the share of
out−of−pocket spending in total health care spending remains below the OECD average (17 percent
compared with 20 percent in 2004)?. Patients enjoy freedom in the choice of the provider and can get
treatment at any time anywhere. On the supply side, medical professionals are limited in number when
compared with other OECD countries. The number of doctors per capita is among the lowest in the
OECD area, although it has been rising rapidly. This appears to be compensated by very high levels of
activity, which often seem to have reached the physical capacity of doctors.
Quality of care and effectiveness of health care spending with respect to broader health care goals
are difficult to measure due to the range of social and lifestyle factors that affect health. Nonetheless,
the health care system does contribute positively to health outcomes to a degree and Japan scores very
high on a wide range of health status measures.
Performance in terms of life expectancy and potential life years lost is among the best in the OECD
? An earlier version of this paper was published in Keimei Kaizuka and Anne Krueger (eds.), 2006, Tackling Japan’s
Fiscal challenges: Strategies to Cope with High Public Debt and Population Aging , Palgrave (Macmillan) and the
International Monetary Fund. The publishers have kindly allowed an updated version to be republished in this volume.
Thanks go to Maria Luisa Gil for technical assistance and to Jeremy Hurst and Gaetan Lafortune for useful comments.
The views expressed here do not reflect those of the OECD.
? OECD.
? This may have risen subsequently as a result of increases in patient cost sharing introduced in 2003.
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area. Seen from a fiscal point of view, Japan spends little on health care, relative to per capita income
and as a share of GDP compared with other OECD countries (Figures 1 and 2). This is the case despite
a slightly higher share of elderly in the total population than the OECD average and the fact that part
of its nursing care spending is counted as health care expenditure.
Nonetheless, concerns have been raised about the quality of care (there tend to be long waiting
times, short consultation periods, and variation in practice patterns across the country). The efficiency
of the health care system is also an issue: the volume of consultations appears to be excessive and
hospital stays tend to be long, reflecting large bed capacity. Moreover, the fragmented social insurance
system has resulted in horizontal inequity in finance as well as the size of insurance funds that is
insufficient to pool health risks effectively?.
There are no obvious performance indicators for nursing care. But the situation prevailing in Japan
prior to the introduction of the nursing care insurance in Apri1 2000 was inefficient beyond any
? For example, in fiscal year 1998 and for a comparable income level, the annual premium for National Insurance funds
varied from a low of ¥138,300 in the 23 wards of Tokyo to a theoretical high of ¥1,070,720 (capped at ¥520,000) in
Sapporo City (Matsutani, 2000). Ironically, administrative costs are not high as most of the health insurance funds limit
the number of staff working to a base minimum because their tasks are limited (they do not process claims) as well as
for financial reasons. The key insurance sector issues are that many of the funds are too small to pool risks effectively,
and to play the role of an insurer. In other words, they tend to be a collector of funds and a payer.
?????? ? ????? ?????? ??????????? ????? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ??????? ????
Notes: Data on total health expenditure (THE) for the following countries are estimated: Belgium, Denmark, Hungary,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Data refer to 2005
except for Australia, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2007.
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doubt?. The demand for nursing care was increasing steadily in the face of shrinking capacity to look
alter the elderly at home and this combined with grossly insufficient public capacity to provide
institutional care. This latter problem had been partially resolved by the expansion of geriatric hospital
beds that was triggered by the policy change in the mid−1970s to make health care for the elderly free
of charge. Thus, while estimates remain controversial, there were some 180,000 elderly who were
effectively receiving nursing care but paid by health care insurance by 1999. After April 2000, this
undesirable situation was significantly improved and the number of beds probably fell to some 60,000,
as a large part of these were reclassified as nursing care beds that are financed by nursing care
insurance?. With a rapid increase in service supply capacity for both institutional and home care that
followed the introduction of nursing care insurance, the situation of excess demand has been largely
corrected.
? The nursing care insurance is social insurance with co−insurance of 10 percent. It is designed to minimize the risk of
supplier−induced demand through an impartial assessment of care needs and to give the service recipient freedom of
choice of care services and providers. Horizontal inequity in premiums is explicitly allowed and is reflected in benefit
levels, although only to a limited degree, as only 18 percent of total benefit is financed by the premiums paid by the
elderly.
? These figures come from <http://www.urban.ne.jp/home/haruki3/syakaiteki.html>. In a recent study, Hatano (2004)
estimated the volume and cost of hospitalization of those aged 65 years and over for non−medical reasons. His
estimates of the number of aged patients hospitalized for non−medical reasons are 221,000 in 1999 and 215,000 in
2002, which shows a much smaller reduction following the introduction of nursing care insurance compared with the
figures cited in the text.
?????? ? ????? ??? ?????? ?????? ??????????? ?? ? ????? ?? ????? ???? ????
Notes: Data refer to 2005 except for Australia, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, which refer to 2004.
Data on health expenditure (both total and public) for the following countries are estimated: Belgium, Denmark, Hungary,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal and Spain. OECD average excludes Mexico and
Turkey.
Sources: OECD Health Data 2007; OECD, Economic Outlook, no. 81; and OECD, Quavterly National Accounts, 2007.
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?III. Health and Nursing Care Spending
Several factors contribute to the low level of total and public health care spending when compared
to other OECD countries. On the supply side, the government has been able to maintain tight control
over the prices paid for health care services through a single national pricing policy. First, the
government has set an overall allowable increase in prices following the recommendation of a
consultative council that comprises representatives from insurance funds, medical service providers,
trade unions, and academics. Second, given the overall price increase, the pattern of relative prices
(that is, the fee schedule) has been modified to discourage the services that the government considers
to be the least cost−effective. But the modification of relative prices has also reflected the relative
political power of the council representatives, notably the strong influence of doctors in private
practice (Campbell and Ikegami, 1998; Ikegami and Campbell, 1999).
For example, the prices for hospital surgery are kept low relative to outpatient consultations, as are
the prices for high−tech medicine such as imaging equipment. Assessing the influence of relative
prices on relative service use is not straightforward as many services are complementary. Given a high
level of beds per capita and the availability of imaging and other high−tech equipment, this pattern of
relative prices has favoured ambulatory care consultations at hospitals, which then have become an
important source of hospital admissions and demand for examinations by advanced imaging
equipment (Imai, 2002). The impact of the likely distortions in relative prices on medical practice and
quality of care remains an area of debate.
On the demand side, the significant cost sharing (30 percent up to a ceiling) may have limited the
demand for health care services. But this cannot explain the low levels of spending when compared
internationally?. Paradoxically, the share of out−of−pocket spending in total health care spending is
below the OECD average, which is partly explained by the banning of balance billing by doctors?.
Statistical factors also help explain the internationally low spending levels as measured. Until the
advent of nursing care insurance in 2000, a significant amount of nursing care was provided by the
small private hospital sector and was recorded as medical care, pushing up the health spending levels.
This, however, has been changing rapidly as supply that is better adapted to nursing care and covered
by nursing care insurance is increasingly becoming available (Mitchell et al., 2004). Hence, one reason
why the spending levels in Japan have been lower since 2000 when compared internationally has been
the change in statistical recording. As a counterpart, both public and total spending for nursing care
has been boosted.
Nonetheless, health−care spending continues to rise with the steady increase in the share of the
elderly in the population as a contributing factor. Over the period 1997−2002, total health care
? Assuming the standard price elasticity of 0.1 to 0.2 and holding other things unchanged, spending levels could have
been higher by 3−6 percent in the absence of the 30 percent co−insurance. But Japan has already had high levels of
consultations per capita that may be constrained by physical limits of doctors, so that even this calculation may be
overestimated.
? The share of out−of−pocket spending, as such, is not the relevant measure. One should also check whether such
spending is insured or not.
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?spending has risen by 1 percentage point of GDP and public spending by 0.75 of a percentage point
although it appears to have stabilised over the following two years. With weak growth in employment
and wages and, as a consequence, social insurance contributions, there have been growing deficits
within the social insurance system (Imai, 2002)?.
OECD data for 2004 suggest that public spending on nursing care was around 1.2 of a percentage
point of GDP, although this may be underestimated because all of the social beds may not have been
included. (Total long−term care spending appears to be 1.7 percentage points of GDP in 2004). With
the advent of nursing care insurance, public nursing care spending rose by 55 percent between 2001
and 2004, which can be decomposed into a rapid increase in the number of recipients (50 percent) and
a rather moderate increase in costs per recipient (5 percent). The rapid increase in spending caused
financial problems for insurers, even though premiums were raised in 2003.
IV. Future Developments in Spending on Care
While Japan has succeeded in containing health care costs more than other wealthy countries, a
number of factors are likely to intensify upward pressure on both public and total health care costs
over the coming decades (Dang et al., 2001; Bains and Oxley, 2004; Oliviera Martens and de la
Maisonneuve, 2006). These factors include:
 Increasing household incomes and changing preferences and attitudes of the population and
patients as regards the level and quality of care provided.
 Further technological change in medicine. While some of these developments can help reduce the
cost of supply, the high levels of investment needed to produce, for example, new drugs, suggest
that, overall, these increases are likely to be cost increasing as in the past. New medical
equipment needs to be purchased and investment in human capital maintained. In addition, new
treatments––such as keyhole surgery or better anaesthetics––can mean a wider share of the
population can be treated.
 To the extent that the elderly consume more health care services than do the younger cohorts, the
demand for both acute care services and long−term nursing care will increase with the projected
rise in the share of the elderly in the population. This process is already underway in Japan: the
share of the population aged 65 and over has increased from 10 percent of the total population in
1980 to 17.5 percent in 2000.
 The demand for nursing care services is also likely to increase as families are less and less able to
provide informal care. Family size has fallen such that there are fewer children to care for the
? There is risk adjustment among social insurers covering the elderly (70 years old and above) and retired employees
who are normally between the ages of 60 and 69. With the aging of the population, transfers from social insurers with
relatively young membership to the Health Service System for the Elderly (HSSE) to cover the benefits for retired
employees have been increasing. This has contributed to the deficits of the social insurance funds that are net
contributors (typically the Society Managed Health Insurance funds and the Government Managed Health Insurance
fund). National Health Insurance funds––which manage the HSSE and retired employees as well as covering the self−
employed and others––receive transfers, but their premium revenues are insufficient to cover the rising benefit
payment.
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?elderly than in the past and they often no longer live in close proximity to their parents. The
labour force participation of women––who have been the main carers for the elderly in the past––
continues to rise as well. Longer working lives, as retirement is delayed by pension reform, may
also contribute to this trend.
 Finally, with health and nursing care becoming both labour− and human−capital−intensive, rising
demand for care services may require higher relative wages and prices to attract more workers
into the sector. Indeed, a major policy issue is whether the current policy of price controls by the
Japanese authorities can be sustained.
V. Projections of Public Health and Nursing Care Spending
The OECD, in collaboration with the European Union and OECD member countries, has
undertaken projection exercises to assess the possible impact of aging populations on public
expenditure over the next half−century. The approach used is described in Box 1. The methodology
has been progressively refined, most recently by Oliveira Martins and de la Maisonneuve (2006) at the
OECD. Estimates of the increase in health and nursing care spending to 2050 on the basis of the
methodology laid out in Box 1 suggest that public health and long−term care spending in Japan––
starting from a base that was 6 percent of GDP in 2005––could rise to between 9 and 13 percent of
GDP by 2050 depending on assumptions. Even the lower estimate has significant implications for
fiscal policy, once combined with the expected growth in pension spending over the same period.
VI. Possible Policy Responses
Some of this increase in the public costs of health and nursing care may well be justified in terms of
the marginal social benefits that ensue, and where this is the case, there is no reason why Japanese
society should not benefit from the continuing flow of new technology that is likely to appear as a
result of recent scientific advances (Aaron, 2003). However, the Japanese authorities will need to
ensure that the health and nursing care systems provide care as efficiently as possible, and efforts in
this direction could help moderate the fiscal impact of an increased allocation of resources to this
domain. In this context, international comparisons suggest a number of areas where reforms could
enhance the performance of the system.
First, in the ambulatory sector, the number of consultations per capita is roughly twice the OECD
average (Figures 3 and 4). At the same time, the number of consultations per doctor is also very high
––over double the OECD average. This is a likely reflection of the fact that doctors are in short
supply, that consultation fees are low, and that doctors are paid on a fee−for−service basis. Some part
of this high level of consultations may not be necessary or reflect regulatory factors?. The average
length of consultations is consequently short, potentially raising problems of quality and patient
? For example, the recent extension of the time period of a prescription before renewal is required appears to have
reduced the number of consultations (see Onda et al., 2004).
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?Box 1 Projecting Public Health and Long−Term Care Spending
The impact of aging on care costs
Initial attempts to project the impact of aging on public health care undertaken by the OECD and member
countries took estimates of health care costs per capita by age group and multiplied these values by the number of
individuals in the respective age group and then summed across age groups. This calculation was then undertaken
for each five−year period from 2005 to 2050 using national projections of the population by age group. Estimates
were then recalibrated to ensure that the estimates for 2000 equalled national accounts or budgetary estimates for
that year. These estimates of health−care costs were then taken as a share of projected GDP. The price of health
care supply was assumed to grow in line with economy−wide labour productivity. A similar approach was used to
estimate nursing care needs and associated public spending.
Values for GDP were calculated on the basis of the growth in employment (allowing for increases in female
participation rates and lower unemployment) and an annual increase in productivity of 1.75 percent per annum.
With a rising share of elderly in the total population and higher per capita spending by the old, the share of
spending in GDP increases in all OECD countries for which calculations have been made.
A number of authors have suggested that this approach may lead to overestimation of the increase in acute health
care costs (Zweifel et al., 1999; Batljan and Lagergren, 2004). They argue that higher per capita spending on health
care among the elderly reflects the fact that mortality rates increase with age and that a large share of lifetime
health care spending occurs in the period just before death. With increases in average lifetimes, mortality in each
age group will decline––particularly among the elderly––and the associated “death−related” costs would be put off
into the future. Average lifetimes are expected to increase by approximately five years during the current half−
century. This moderating effect will partly offset the impact of aging as the baby−boom generation moves into
retirement where mortality rates are higher. The more recent calculations have attempted to take this effect into
account. These estimates have also assumed that the increase in lifetimes will be in good health. These two
assumptions combined with the projected lengthening of average lifetimes moderates the effect of the aging of the
baby−boom generation on health care costs.
Non−aging−related spending increases
The changing population structure as a result of population aging can explain only a small part of the past
increase in public health care spending in most OECD countries. The significant rise in spending as a share of GDP
over the past three decades has been generally attributed to rising incomes and a range of unidentifiable forces
grouped under the generic title of “technological change.” The latter has been determined by a wide range of
factors––including policies that affect both demand and supply for health care and its price. But there appears to be
widespread agreement that technological change has played a large role in any past increase (Newhouse, 1992;
Productivity Commission, 2005).
It has not been possible to identify the separate impact of income from that of technological factors with any
precision. A very approximate separation has assumed that non−aging factors are affectedby: (a) income, assuming
that the elasticity of health care spending with respect to income is one; and (b) a residual which is what is left over
after aging and these income effects have been accounted for. Projections of the non−aging factors were calculated
on the basis of projected trends in income using the same income elasticity and various assumptions concerning the
path of the residual.
? 14 ? Vol.58 No.2OSAKA ECONOMIC PAPERS
?6,
79
5
0
000,1
000,2
000,3
000,4
000,5
000,6
000,7
000,8
Ko
aer paJ
an
Slo
va
k
eR
up
blic
uH
n
ag
yr
 hcezC
R
pe
u
lb ic
Po
la
dn
Sp
nia
aC
n
da
a
Lu
xe
b
m
o
gru
Au
str
alia
nU
i et
d
niK
 
g
od
m yekruT eD
nm
ar
k
mreG
a
yn narF
ce
Au
str
ia
Be
lgiu
m ylatI iF n
dnal nalecI
d
nU
i et
d
tatS
 
es
Me
xi
oc
eN
w
aeZ
 
lan
d
eN
t eh
r
nal
ds
Po
gutr
al
Sw
ti ze
r
nal
d
Sw
de
en
raey rep snoitatlusnoC
494 2 egareva DCEO
13
.8
0
2
4
6
8
01
21
41
61
paJ
an
 hcezC
R
pe
u
lb ic
uH
n
ag
yr
Ko
aer
Slo
va
k
eR
up
blic Sp
nia
Be
lgiu
m
eD
nm
ar
k
mreG
a
yn ylatI
Au
str
ia
narF
ce nalecI
d
Po
la
dn
Au
str
alia
Lu
xe
b
m
o
gru
aC
n
da
a
eN
t eh
r
nal
ds
nU
i et
d
niK
 
g
od
m
iF n
dnal
Po
gutr
al
nU
i et
d
tatS
 
es
Sw
ti ze
r
nal
d
eN
w
aeZ
 
lan
d yekruT Sw
de
en
Me
xi
oc
atipac rep snoitatlusnoC
7 egareva DCEO
?????? ? ????????????? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ?????????? ????
Notes: Data refer to 2005, except for Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Mexico,
the Slovak Republic, Sweden, Turkey and the United States to 2004; New Zealand and Spain to 2003; and Switzerland to
2002. New Zealand presents a break in 2003 for the series on “Doctor’s consultations per capita” and Poland presents a
break in 2005 for the series “Practising physicians”, OECD average excludes Greece, Ireland and Norway.
Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2007.
?????? ? ????????????? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ?????????? ????
Notes: Data refer to 2005, except for Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Mexico,
the Slovak Republic, Sweden, Turkey and the United States to 2004; New Zealand and Spain to 2003; and Switzerland to
2002. New Zealand presents a break in 2003. OECD average excludes Greece, Ireland and Norway.
Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2007.
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dissatisfaction?.
Second, and despite some overestimation, Japan also has the highest number of acute care hospital
beds per capita in the OECD (Figure 5)??. While inpatient admissions are lower than the OECD
average, occupancy rates are high, reflecting long average lengths of stay estimated to be in the range
of 20 days (Figure 6)??. Once again, incentives are probably important in explaining this outcome:
hospitals are largely paid on a bed−day basis.
Third, the level of per capita drug consumption remains slightly above the OECD average (Figure
7). This is thought to reflect, at least partly, the fact that doctors had an incentive to over−prescribe as
they can sell as well as prescribe pharmaceutical drugs, and a significant portion of their income has
come from this source. However, the growth in spending on pharmaceutical drugs has slowed sharply
in recent years, reflecting the progressive narrowing of the profit margins on drug sales by doctors
along with a substantial increase in the fee they can receive by issuing prescriptions. Around half of all
drug prescriptions are now handled by pharmacies.
A final concern is the fragmentation of the insurance system as there are over 5,000 separate
insurers. This leads to financial instability and also limits the capacity of the insurers to share risks and
? See Imai (2002) and Campbell and Ikegami (1998) for a description of measures of satisfaction of patients with
treatment received and with the system overall.
?? See note 5 above and the text to which it refers.
?? Low admission rates may reflect a cultural dislike of invasive surgery. There is a problem of international
comparability in the statistical information regarding hospitalization in Japan. The average length of stay reported in
the OECD Health Data 2007 was 35.7 days in 2005. This number includes long−term (health) care beds. While there
are no official statistics covering acute care beds alone, the figure compiled by the Japan Hospital Association for 2001
is quoted to be 18.4 days (Ishii, 2002).
?????? ? ????? ???? ???????? ???? ??? ????? ??????????? ????
Notes: Data refer to 2005 except for Australia, Canada, Denmark, Greece and Spain. Turkey presents a break in 2005.
OECD average excludes Iceland and New Zealand.
Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2007.
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Notes: Canada presents a break in 1995. Data for Switzerland for 1995 refers to 1994. Data refer to 2005 except for the
following countries Australia, Canada, Italy, Spain to 2004; Korea o 2003; Poland to 2002; and Denmark and Greece to
2001.
Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2007.
?????? ? ?????????????? ???? ???????? ??? ??????? ????
Notes: Data refer to 2005 except for Australia, Hungary and Japan to 2004 and the Netherlands to 2002. Data for the
following countries are estimated: Denmark, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal and Spain.
OECD average excludes Belgium, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2007.
????????? 2008 ? 17 ?Managing Public Costs in the Japanese Health and Nursing Care Sector
?to oversee provider performance––either in terms of cost or quality. Limited risk sharing from large−
scale pooling and inadequate adjustments to allow for differences in risks across insurers has led to
wide differences in premiums across insurance funds, particularly (but not only) in the national health
insurance system that covers the self−employed and farmers and the retired and is operated at the
municipal level.
VII. Areas Where Efficiency Could be Improved
The area with the greatest scope for gains in efficiency is the hospital sector, where a major
downsizing is called for. First, nursing care patients need to be shifted to more appropriate and less
expensive long−stay nursing care facilities that are better adapted to the needs of the elderly. The
nursing care insurance introduced in 2000 has been facilitating this shift. As noted, a major shift
occurred in 2000 following the reclassification of some of acute beds as nursing care beds. Progress
since has been slow, and it will require further expansion of supply. Even after this shift has been
completed, the over−supply of acute beds is likely to remain as this partly reflects the incentives
arising from the system of payment by bed−days. Shifting to a prospective pricing system such as a
diagnosis−related group would encourage hospitals to reduce length of stay and place pressure on
hospitals to downsize. The government has moved to introduce all inclusive payments per patient (the
Diagnosis Procedure Combination) mainly to larger university hospitals. This has reportedly led to
reductions in average length of stay. More widespread application began in 2003 but progress has
been slow, particularly as there are wide differences in practice and cost patterns across hospitals.
Such policies need to be consolidated and extended to the rest of the hospital system and combined
with a wider policy of rationalization to ensure adequate supply in less−well−served areas.
Developments in the ambulatory sector concern quality issues as much as cost and efficiency.
Physician training carried out by medical schools can vary and this is widely believed to have resulted
in considerable variation differences in practice patterns and treatment??. This may also be the main
reason why the Japanese ambulatory system suffers from the absence of doctors specialized as general
practitioners (GPs). Policies in this area, however, have been evolving. The training of new doctors as
generalists has begun and efforts are being made to adopt common clinical guidelines and the
retraining of specialists.
With part of doctors’ income coming from the sale of drugs, there can be conflicts of interest,
potentially leading to higher prescribing than necessary. As noted, policy changes have reduced the
incentives to sell pharmaceuticals over time, but there is scope for further limiting doctors’ rights in
this area. Over−prescribing may also be reduced by more widespread introduction of prescribing
protocols, greater use of generic drugs and closer attention to the cost effectiveness and prices of new
?? This phenomenon, known as small area variation (SAV), is observed elsewhere. In Japan, weak information
dissemination has prevented the collection of data on SAV. But given the dominant influence of the professor running
the Ikyoku––a highly specialized pyramidal unit within a medical school, where clinical training is offered––it can be
reasonably expected that idiosyncratic treatment patterns prevail. This pattern of physician training is not suitable for
the training of GPs either as they need knowledge in a wide range of specialized areas.
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Reforms that are being introduced in the insurance sector may improve efficiency and reduce
financing inequity across funds. First, efforts are currently underway to consolidate the fiscal
operations of the municipally−managed national health insurance (NHI) funds at the prefecture level,
which should improve risk sharing and eliminate the horizontal inequity within a given prefecture,
though inter−prefecture inequity would remain. Second, from October 2008, the government will split
the management of the hitherto single government−managed health insurance (GMHI) into prefectural
units, in order to reflect better the regional differences in income, age and other demographic factors in
the pricing of premiums. These two developments may pave the way for eventual integration of NHI
and GMHI at the prefectural level.
Rationalizing the scale of operation alone will not, however, be enough for these insurance funds to
play a proper role as an insurer. Up to now, the Medical Fee Payment Fund has been entrusted with
the screening of all bills presented by the providers for fraud and excessive medication, but this
screening process has not been used as a utilization review mechanism to check the rapid growth in
services. Progress in this area requires not only further improvements in data collection on provider
activity but also empowering the insurance funds to sign contracts with service providers??. ICT
technology will need to be expanded: less than 0.5 percent of the bills presented to the Payment Fund
were in electronic form around the year 2001 (Imai, 2002) and this limits the scope for third−party
oversight. The lack of a single social insurance number is a further obstacle in this process.
As another area of reform, effective April 2008, the government abolished the Health Service
System for the Elderly, which had effectively existed only on the books (because it had no
independent financial resources of its own), and replaced it with a separate social insurance fund for
the elderly to which the elderly are now expected to pay premiums. This scheme, however, is confined
to functioning as collector and payer, just like all other social insurance funds. Thus, it can be seen as a
pretext for raising more revenues through more premiums. In fact, premiums are to be reassessed
every two years, which means that, with the further aging of the population and the cap on the share of
government contributions, premiums can only be expected to increase over time.
There has recently been an increase in the rate of co−insurance to 30 percent, but this has been
combined with an extension of free care to a larger share of the poor population so that the net impact
on the demand for health care is difficult to judge. Some further increase in the co−insurance ceiling
for better−off households could help limit the growth in demand and the costs to the social health
insurance system without prejudicing access to care. On the other hand, the progressive easing of
restrictions on balance billing that is underway reduces cost sharing and boosts public health
spending??. After five years of existence, the nursing care insurance system is being reviewed. As this
system met the needs of the society, the benefit payment grew rapidly causing financial difficulties.
?? This would mean a departure from the current policy of uniform fees. Increasingly, however, this principle has been
violated as the government has attempted to cope with the complexity of reality. For example, in order to discourage
outpatient consultations at large hospitals, the co−payment a patient makes at each new visit has been raised and the
fees for consultations reduced for large hospitals (note that the concept of balance billing differs somewhat from that
used in North America).
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?Premiums were raised in 2003 but the benefit payments have continued to increase. In an attempt to
ensure financial sustainability, consideration is being given to widening the contribution base to
include workers below the age of 40, which is politically difficult to implement without proposing
some benefit to younger generations??.
Rationalization of benefits should also be required. The current structure of benefits unduly favours
institutional care, whereas the policy intention has been to promote home care??. But with diminishing
availability of family members to look after the frail elderly, it would seem difficult to promote home
care further without increased budgetary allocations to this activity.
As the nursing care industry has grown rapidly, the core employees have been overloaded by
normal duties and training of new employees. This has created problems of low quality of services in
some instances. Moreover, rapid growth in demand seems to have affected the work of care managers
in playing the gatekeeper role in the system. As a result, the assessment of care needs has tended to err
on the side of generosity. Concern has also been expressed that care managers are effectively captured
by service providers. Ways of ensuring the neutrality of care managers are under consideration.
VIII. Conclusion
Part success in cost containment––when compared with other OECD countries––appears to have
largely relied on price controls for health care provision and more recently on greater cost sharing. The
scope for further gains from price restraint may now be limited and the authorities will now have to
search for other policies to limit costs??. There appears to be considerable scope to increase the
efficiency of the health care system in view of apparent excess supply of beds in the hospital sector,
extremely high activity in the ambulatory sector and above−average spending on pharmaceutical
drugs. These outcomes reflect, to a considerable extent, the incentives inherent in the fee−for−service
payment arrangements and the passive role played by third−party payers.
Greater attention now needs to be focused on changing the incentives facing providers, restructuring
the hospital sector and introducing more ICT technology to facilitate utilization reviews by insurers.
Finally, continued efforts to restrain excess and inappropriate consumption of pharmaceutical drugs
will be needed. As for the nursing care sector, the insurance system is much better−designed than in
health care so that efforts should be focused on making the existing system work better––notably
through rationalization of benefit structure and securing the neutrality of care managers––and ensuring
financial sustainability by raising premium contributions rather than broadening the base to younger
?? The prohibition of balance billing has meant that a patient must bear the total cost of a treatment even if some part of it
is normally covered by social insurance. For example, a patient having chemotherapy using drugs not covered by social
insurance is denied the coverage of blood tests that are an integral part of chemotherapy. The positive list of exceptions
to balance billing has been expanded and this process is likely to continue.
?? One possibility is to extend the coverage to all cases requiring nursing care (for example, those below 65 who are
handicapped by accidents). But the cost of such coverage extension would be enormous.
?? The ratio of home versus institutional care did change from a ratio of 7:3 initially to 3:1 more recently.
?? For example, fees for medical procedures were cut by the central authority by 1.3 percent in 2002 and by as much as
5−30 percent for some services such as CT scans and MRIs (Ikegami, 2003, cited in Mitchell et al., 2004).
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